security.txt fields explained, one by one
A security.txt is only a few lines long, but every line follows rules: which values are allowed, whether a field may repeat, what RFC 9116 requires and what the German BSI TR-03183-3 adds on top. This page is the reference for all of it, field by field, with examples and the mistakes that checkers report most often.
How the file is built
security.txt is a plain text file encoded in UTF-8 (RFC 9116 section 4). Each line is a field, a comment or blank. A field always has a name and a value, separated by a colon and a space:
Contact: mailto:security@example.com
Section 2 and the grammar in section 4 of the RFC set a small number of firm rules:
- One field per line. You must not chain several values into one field unless the field definition allows it. Only Preferred-Languages does.
- Field names are case-insensitive.
contact:works just likeContact:. The spelling used in the RFC is the convention and the easiest to read. - A space follows the colon. The grammar requires it (
fs SP).Contact:mailto:...without the space is, strictly speaking, invalid. - Comments start with
#at the beginning of the line. They may contain any Unicode characters (section 2.1). - Line endings are CRLF or LF (section 2.2). Blank lines are allowed.
- Repetition: any field may appear more than once, except Expires, Preferred-Languages and Bug-Bounty, which appear at most once.
- Order: the order of fields does not matter, with one exception: multiple Contact fields are listed in order of preference.
- Unknown fields are allowed. Readers must ignore fields they do not support (section 2.4). A misspelt field name is therefore not a syntax error; it is simply skipped.
BSI TR-03183-3, the German Federal Office for Information Security's guideline for manufacturers, tightens two points. Outside comments, only the ASCII characters 0x20 to 0x7E may be used (4.2.1 c), so no accented letters in values; a domain such as müller.de goes into the file as xn--mller-kva.de. And each block of fields should be introduced by a fixed comment such as # Our security addresses; you will find the exact wording under each field below.
The signature block
A signed file is an OpenPGP cleartext signature. RFC 9116 recommends it (section 2.3), the TR requires it (4.2.10). The readable content sits between two armour lines:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Contact: mailto:security@example.com
Expires: 2027-10-01T00:00:00.000Z
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iHUEARYKAB0WIQ...
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
One quirk of cleartext signatures: when signing, GnuPG puts - in front of any line that starts with a hyphen (dash escaping, the line-dash rule in the RFC). A comment divider such as #----- is fine; a line that begins directly with ----- will look different after signing. How to create keys and sign the file is covered in Signing security.txt with GnuPG.
All fields at a glance
As of 7 March 2026, the IANA registry for security.txt fields lists ten fields. Eight come from RFC 9116, CSAF was added in 2023 and Bug-Bounty in March 2026. Only Contact and Expires are required by the RFC.
| Field | RFC 9116 | BSI TR-03183-3 | Repeatable |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contact | Required | Required, fixed order (4.2.3) | yes |
| Expires | Required | Required, upper-case T and Z (4.2.9) | no |
| Encryption | Optional | Required for every email address (4.2.4) | yes |
| Canonical | Optional | Required (4.2.2) | yes |
| Preferred-Languages | Optional | Required, including en (4.2.6) | no |
| Policy | Optional | Required (4.2.7) | yes |
| Acknowledgments | Optional | Recommended (4.2.5) | yes |
| CSAF | IANA registry | Recommended (4.2.8) | yes |
| Hiring | Optional | Not covered | yes |
| Bug-Bounty | IANA registry | Not covered | no |
Which of the two standards fits you is explained in the guide. In short: RFC 9116 is enough for an ordinary company website, while the TR is the yardstick for manufacturers of products with digital elements.
Contact
Purpose: Contact tells people where to report a vulnerability. It is the reason the file exists.
Required? RFC 9116 requires at least one Contact field (section 2.5.3). The TR fixes the order: first the PSIRT functional mailbox, then the CSIRT mailbox, then the web page for incoming reports (4.2.3 b to d), introduced by the comment # Our security addresses.
Syntax: the value is always a URI. Email addresses take mailto:, phone numbers tel:, web pages https://. A plain http:// link is not allowed. A plus sign or other special character in the address is percent-encoded, so + becomes %2B.
# Our security addresses
Contact: mailto:psirt@example.com
Contact: mailto:csirt@example.com
Contact: https://www.example.com/security-contact/
Common mistake: an address without mailto:, as in Contact: security@example.com. A human understands it, a checker sees an invalid URI. Just as common: info@ as the only contact, where a report gets lost between sales enquiries and invoices.
Tip: RFC 9116 refers to RFC 2142, which reserves security@ for security matters. If you follow the TR, use psirt@ and csirt@ (4.3.1 g and i). A phone number is allowed but rarely used; if you list one, make sure whoever answers knows what to do with the call. What needs to be in place behind the address is covered in Setting up a security contact.
Expires
Purpose: Expires states the date and time after which the content of the file is considered stale and should not be used (RFC 9116 section 2.5.5). The RFC is blunt about why: outdated details can send reports to the wrong place, and having no file may be better than having one with stale information (section 5.3).
Required? Under both the RFC and the TR, the field must appear exactly once. The RFC recommends a date less than a year ahead; the TR says it should be at most one year ahead (4.2.9 b).
Syntax: date and time as per RFC 3339, including a time zone, for example 2027-10-01T00:00:00.000Z or 2027-10-01T00:00:00+02:00. The TR additionally requires an upper-case T as the separator and an upper-case Z for UTC; no other separators are allowed (4.2.9 a). The RFC's own example, 2021-12-31T18:37:07z with a lower-case z, would fail under the TR.
Expires: 2027-10-01T00:00:00.000Z
Common mistakes: a date in the past, a date without a time (2027-10-01), a local format such as 01/10/2027, or a date years ahead so nobody has to think about it again. Checkers flag all four. What to do once the date has passed is covered in security.txt expired.
Tip: pick a date just under a year ahead and put a reminder in the calendar a few weeks before. The TR requires the content to be reviewed at least quarterly anyway (4.2.9 c), which is the natural moment to move Expires forward too. Sign again after every change.
If you would rather not keep that reminder yourself: monitoring checks the file every day and warns you before it expires, for 60 euros net per domain per year.
Encryption
Purpose: Encryption points to a key that reporters can use to write to you confidentially (section 2.5.4). This matters because a good report often describes exactly how to get into a system.
Required? Optional under the RFC, recommended whenever Contact lists an email address. Under the TR it is required for every email address in Contact (4.2.4), introduced by # Our OpenPGP keys.
Syntax: the key itself must not appear in the file, only a URI where it can be retrieved. RFC 9116 allows three forms: a web address starting with https://, a DNS record of type OPENPGPKEY (dns:...?type=OPENPGPKEY) or a fingerprint (openpgp4fpr:...). The TR is stricter: the address must link directly to the ASCII-armoured key file as .asc, not to a page with a download button (4.3.2 a and d). The fingerprints must also be published on your website (4.3.2 b).
# Our OpenPGP keys
Encryption: https://www.example.com/.well-known/psirt.asc
Encryption: https://www.example.com/.well-known/csirt.asc
Common mistake: Encryption points to an HTML page, a keyserver search or a key that expired long ago. Also frequent: the key belongs to a different address from the one in Contact.
Tip: the key in Encryption is not the signing key. The RFC explicitly warns reporters not to assume they are the same, and the TR recommends a dedicated key just for signing (4.2.10 b). Use one key per functional mailbox (4.3.1 j). How to create one and export it as .asc is shown in the GnuPG guide.
Canonical
Purpose: Canonical gives the address where the file officially lives (section 2.5.2). Together with the signature, it proves that a retrieved file is meant for that address and has not been copied from somewhere else.
Required? Optional under the RFC, but recommended when the file is signed (section 2.3). Required under the TR (4.2.2): a web address that reflects the true location of the file and is reachable without redirects, introduced by # Our canonical URI.
Syntax: a web address starting with https://. The field may repeat if the same file is served under several addresses.
# Our canonical URI
Canonical: https://www.example.com/.well-known/security.txt
Canonical: https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt
Common mistake: the file is served on www.example.com but Canonical only names example.com. The RFC is clear on this: if the address the file was retrieved from is not listed in any Canonical field, its content should not be trusted. Checkers report it as an error.
Tip: a file only ever applies to the domain it was retrieved from (section 3.1). If you serve the same file on several host names, list all of them in Canonical. Under the TR the canonical address must not redirect; if example.com redirects to www.example.com, only the www address counts as a valid canonical URI.
Preferred-Languages
Purpose: Preferred-Languages lists the languages in which you can read reports (section 2.5.8). If the field is missing, reporters may assume English.
Required? Optional under the RFC and allowed at most once. Required under the TR, with at least en (4.2.6), introduced by # Our preferred languages.
Syntax: language tags as per RFC 5646, separated by commas, such as en, fr or pt-BR. It is the only field that allows several values on one line. The order is not a ranking; all listed languages carry equal weight.
# Our preferred languages
Preferred-Languages: en, fr, de
Common mistake: two Preferred-Languages lines instead of one, spelt-out names such as English, French, or country codes such as UK. As a language tag, uk means Ukrainian.
Tip: list only languages in which someone can genuinely read and answer a technical report. English belongs in almost every file, because many researchers work internationally.
Policy
Purpose: Policy links to your vulnerability disclosure policy (section 2.5.7). That is where you explain what you consider a vulnerability, how you handle reports, which timelines you set yourself and what reporters can rely on. The RFC also recommends describing the scope of the file there (section 3.1).
Required? Optional under the RFC, required under the TR (4.2.7), introduced by # Our security policy.
Syntax: a web address starting with https://.
# Our security policy
Policy: https://www.example.com/security-policy/
Common mistake: Policy points to the privacy notice or the general terms of use. Neither is a disclosure policy.
Tip: the policy is also your best tool against beg bounty emails. One clear sentence saying there is no reward programme, plus a definition of what counts as a valid vulnerability (TR 4.4.5), saves a lot of replies. Our CVD policy template drafts one with everything the TR asks for.
Acknowledgments
Purpose: Acknowledgments links to a page where you thank reporters, often called a hall of fame (section 2.5.1). The RFC advises publishing only as much about each vulnerability as cannot be turned into an attack.
Required? Optional under the RFC, recommended under the TR (4.2.5), introduced by # Our security acknowledgements page. The TR ties this to a commitment: anyone who reports a valid vulnerability should, on request, be listed there by name or alias (4.4.4 f).
Syntax: a web address starting with https://.
# Our security acknowledgements page
Acknowledgments: https://www.example.com/security-thanks/
Common mistake: the British spelling Acknowledgements. In the RFC and the IANA registry the field is Acknowledgments, without the e. Because readers must ignore unknown fields, the misspelt line is not reported as an error; it is silently skipped. To add to the confusion, the TR uses the British spelling in its comment and headings. In a comment that does not matter, in the field name it does.
Tip: the page can start out empty, with one sentence on how to get listed. It is a reward that costs nothing and that serious researchers value.
CSAF
Purpose: CSAF points to the provider-metadata.json file of the Common Security Advisory Framework, an OASIS standard for machine-readable security advisories. Tools use that file to find your advisories automatically, for example to show customers which of their devices are affected.
Required? Not in the RFC; listed in the IANA registry since 15 February 2023, with OASIS as change controller. Recommended under the TR (4.2.8), introduced by # Our security advisories. In CSAF 2.0, the field is one of three ways a CSAF provider can make its metadata discoverable (requirements 8 to 10, at least one is needed).
Syntax: a web address starting with https:// that points directly to provider-metadata.json. The field may repeat, for example after a merger, but CSAF 2.0 advises against it and requires an address under /.well-known/csaf/ to be listed first in that case.
# Our security advisories
CSAF: https://www.example.com/.well-known/csaf/provider-metadata.json
Common mistake: CSAF points to an HTML advisory page or a PDF archive. The field is meant only for the JSON metadata.
Tip: only add the field if you actually publish CSAF documents. A link to nothing is worse than no field. For manufacturers who issue advisories regularly anyway, CSAF is the way to make them machine-readable.
Hiring
Purpose: Hiring links to security-related job openings (section 2.5.6). Whoever reads your security.txt is often exactly the kind of person you are looking for.
Required? Optional under the RFC, not covered by the TR.
Syntax: a web address starting with https://.
Hiring: https://www.example.com/careers/security/
Common mistake: Hiring points to the general careers page, which has not listed a security role for months.
Tip: only add it when there are suitable openings, and include it in your quarterly review.
Bug-Bounty
Purpose: Bug-Bounty states in machine-readable form whether you pay for reports. True signals that reporters may receive a financial reward through a bug bounty programme, False that no such reward is offered. The registry entry refers to the CERT Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure from Carnegie Mellon University.
Required? Not in the RFC; in the IANA registry since 7 March 2026 and allowed at most once. The TR does not cover it, as it predates the field.
Syntax: True or False.
Bug-Bounty: False
Common mistake: values such as No, none or a link to the programme. The registry only knows True and False; programme details belong in your policy.
Tip: Bug-Bounty: False is the simplest measure against emails asking for a reward. It will not stop all of them, but it gives your reply something to point to. More on that in security.txt spam.
Complete example with every field
This is what a file using all ten fields and following the TR layout looks like. It is signed before publishing; the signature lines are left out here for clarity. More ready-made files, including the shortest valid one and one full of typical mistakes, are on the examples page.
# Our canonical URI
Canonical: https://www.example.com/.well-known/security.txt
# Our security addresses
Contact: mailto:psirt@example.com
Contact: mailto:csirt@example.com
Contact: https://www.example.com/security-contact/
# Our OpenPGP keys
Encryption: https://www.example.com/.well-known/psirt.asc
Encryption: https://www.example.com/.well-known/csirt.asc
# Our security acknowledgements page
Acknowledgments: https://www.example.com/security-thanks/
# Our preferred languages
Preferred-Languages: en, fr, de
# Our security policy
Policy: https://www.example.com/security-policy/
# Our security advisories
CSAF: https://www.example.com/.well-known/csaf/provider-metadata.json
Hiring: https://www.example.com/careers/security/
Bug-Bounty: False
Expires: 2027-10-01T00:00:00.000Z
Whether your own file follows these rules takes the checker a few seconds to tell you, against RFC 9116 or the TR, including signature and keys.
Frequently asked questions
Which fields are required in security.txt?
Under RFC 9116 only two: Contact, at least once, and Expires, exactly once. BSI TR-03183-3 adds Canonical, Encryption for every email address, Preferred-Languages including English, Policy and a signature.
What date format does Expires use?
RFC 3339 with time and time zone, for example 2027-10-01T00:00:00.000Z. Under the TR, T and Z must be upper case. A date without a time or in a local format is invalid.
Is it Acknowledgments or Acknowledgements?
Acknowledgments, without the e after the g. That is the spelling in RFC 9116 and the IANA registry. Checkers treat the British spelling as an unknown field and ignore it.
Can I list more than one Contact?
Yes, as many as you need, each on its own line. Order matters: the first one is the preferred channel. Under the TR, the PSIRT mailbox, the CSIRT mailbox and the reporting page come in that order.
Can I paste my PGP key into security.txt?
No. RFC 9116 explicitly forbids keys in the Encryption field. The field only holds the address where the key can be retrieved, under the TR directly as an .asc file.
Do I need the CSAF field?
Only if you publish security advisories in CSAF format. The TR recommends it for manufacturers but does not require it. A link to a file that does not exist does more harm than good.
Are security.txt field names case-sensitive?
No, RFC 9116 makes field names case-insensitive. Values can be another matter, for example the T and Z in the date under the TR.
What happens to fields that are not in the standard?
They are allowed, and readers that do not know them ignore them. New fields are added through the IANA registry, most recently Bug-Bounty in March 2026.
Sources
- RFC 9116: A File Format to Aid in Security Vulnerability Disclosure, sections 2, 2.1 to 2.5.8, 3.1, 4 and 5.3, IETF, April 2022.
- IANA registry: security.txt Fields, as of 7 March 2026.
- BSI TR-03183-3 Vulnerability Reports and Notifications, version 1.0.0, sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.10, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.4 and 4.4.5, German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), 20 August 2025.
- Common Security Advisory Framework Version 2.0, sections 7.1.7 to 7.1.10 and 7.2.2, OASIS Standard, 18 November 2022.
- RFC 3339: Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps, IETF, July 2002.
- RFC 5646: Tags for Identifying Languages, IETF, September 2009.
- RFC 2142: Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and Functions, section 4, IETF, May 1997.